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LEGAL RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND THE DREAM OF 
INTERDISCIPLINARITY 
 
IJ Kroeze  
 
1 Introduction 
 
In law, as in other disciplines, there is an increased call for the advancement of 
interdisciplinary research. This call is informed by a general perception that 
academic disciplines tend to exist in "silos" and that this is in some way a bad thing. 
Therefore research across disciplinary boundaries will result in a more integrated 
scientific enterprise and this is regarded as a good thing. In particular, there are 
calls for researchers in academia to do research on education practices and 
pedagogy.1 Law as a discipline has not escaped this general trend.2 The rise (and 
mostly fall) of interdisciplinary attempts like law-and-economics, law-and-literature 
and law-and-sociology bear witness to this.3 In fact, at UNISA the advancement of 
multi-, inter- and transdisciplinary (MIT) research is regarded as a strategic objective 
in the College of Law.4 It is this direct factor, as well as the more general one 
already mentioned, that has provided the rationale for this article. 
 
                                                 
  Irma J Kroeze. BA, Honns BA, LLB, LLM (PU for CHE), LLD (UNISA). Professor, Department of 
Jurisprudence, School of Law, UNISA. Email: kroezij@unisa.ac.za. This contribution is based on a 
paper delivered by the author at the First International MIT Conference hosted by the College of 
Law, UNISA at Mount Grace Hotel and Spa, 13-15 August 2012. The financial support of the 
UNISA College of Law Research and Innovation Committee for this research is hereby gratefully 
acknowledged. 
1  For example, Yale recently launched a PhD aimed specifically at legal pedagogy (see Yale 2012 
http://www.bit.ly/15J6m7Q) and Thurgood Marshall School of Law has a Centre of Legal 
Pedagogy (see Thurgood Marshall School of Law 2011 http://www.bit.ly/12MThHA). Research 
into ODL (Open Distance Learning) is also a strategic objective in the College of Law at UNISA. 
2  See Balkin 1996 Wash & Lee L Rev 950: "Interdisciplinary scholarship is now an expected part of 
a serious scholar's work at most of the elite law schools in this country (the USA). Because these 
schools generally are looked up to as leaders of academic fashion and because they produce 
most of the new law professors, one would think that the future of interdisciplinary scholarship 
looks exceedingly bright. Indeed, I want to emphasize that at most elite schools today a bright 
young scholar who professed no interest whatsoever in interdisciplinary scholarship would find it 
very hard to get a job." 
3  Some of these past attempts will be discussed in sections 5 and 6 below. 
4  There are various references to UNISA in this article. These should be regarded as illustrations, 
but the assumption is that these kinds of programmes and objectives exist at most, if not all, 
universities. 
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Research methodology and the associated questions it raises are usually regarded as 
part of the philosophy of science. Most of the important and ground-breaking work 
in the philosophy of science has been undertaken by scholars in the natural sciences. 
Research methodology in the natural sciences has received a lot of attention from 
such luminaries as Bertrand Russell,5 Ludwig Wittgenstein,6 Karl Popper7 and Paul 
Feyerabend.8 (It is interesting to note that they were all mathematicians as well as 
philosophers of science.) Research methodology is also an enduring theme in the 
social sciences, beginning with Auguste Comte.9 The same cannot be said about the 
humanities. More specifically, the subject of legal research methodology is not one 
that is extensively covered in legal literature in South Africa.10 What there is, is 
either a debate about positivism in legal interpretation or is at best concerned with 
the nitty-gritty of research methods mostly focused on legal practice.11 This is also 
the focus of research and skills modules in the LLB curriculum at most South African 
universities. These are therefore concerned with research method (which focuses on 
practical methods, sources and presentation) as opposed to research methodology 
which is part of the philosophy of science. Research methodology is the study of 
research methods and not an exposition of the methods themselves. It therefore 
examines the assumptions, hypotheses and meta-narratives that underlie research 
methods. It is with methodology rather than method that this article is concerned. 
 
Methodology therefore asks the questions preceding the methods of science. It 
addresses questions such as what is the nature of science and what distinguishes 
science from other modes of knowledge? Is the nature of science fixed or is it 
different in the various kinds of sciences? This then leads to the interesting question 
of whether law is a science and, if so, what kind of science is it? And if we are to do 
interdisciplinary research, what do we mean by the term "discipline" and what kind 
of discipline is law? Once we have addressed all of these questions we can then try 
                                                 
5  See Russell Human Knowledge; Russell Scientific Outlook. 
6  Wittgenstein Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. 
7  Popper Conjectures and Refutations; Popper Logic of Scientific Discovery. 
8  Feyerabend Against Method. 
9  Andreski Essential Comte. 
10  The exception to this generally true statement is Venter et al Regsnavorsing. Unfortunately this 
excellent book was never widely used because it wasn't available in English. 
11  See, for example, Marnewick "Preparation for Trial" 221-235. 
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to define what multi-, inter- and transdisciplinarity mean and decide whether it is 
possible to do this in law. 
 
It must be reiterated that this is not about research methods. Methodology asks 
much more fundamental and difficult questions. To attempt to answer these 
questions, this paper is divided into five sections. The first part tries to determine 
what science is and whether law can be properly regarded as science. The second 
part looks at the division between the sciences to determine where law fits in. The 
focus then shifts to the nature of a discipline to determine what kind of discipline law 
is. The fourth section defines multi-, inter- and transdisciplinarity before moving to a 
conclusion about interdisciplinarity in law. 
 
2 The Royal Society and the nature of science 
 
The following story is included as part of the history of science and is intended to 
illustrate some of the abstract concepts throughout. On 13 April 1769 the young 
Joseph Banks arrived on the island of Haiti.12 He was part of a group of well-to-do 
amateur scientists on an expedition led by the later famous Captain Cook to observe 
the transit of Venus. Banks himself was a self-taught astronomer with a keen 
interest in what was known at the time as naturalist studies, that is botany and 
zoology. With him went an extended group of astronomers, naturalists, artists and 
such. While in Haiti, Banks – in the fashion of his day – began collecting and 
recording specimens of plants and animals. In line with the meticulous methods of 
naturalist study, these were carefully observed, catalogued, preserved and 
reproduced. That is why it was necessary to take along artists. But Banks went 
further. He started to use the methods of naturalist studies to study the indigenous 
people and their culture. He found it considerably more difficult to remain as 
dispassionate as with the plants though and became embroiled in political and 
personal entanglements. But in the process he founded a new discipline – 
anthropology. 
 
                                                 
12  The description of the Haiti expedition is based on Holmes Age of Wonder 1-59. 
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The expedition eventually returned to England, laden with information, specimens 
and drawings. This formed the basis for the establishment of both the Royal Society 
and Kew Gardens in London. The relevance of this story will hopefully become 
clearer later on, but for now the important aspect is the motto of the newly-formed 
Royal Society: nullius in verba. This can be roughly translated as "take nobody's 
word for it" or, if you prefer a more contemporary version: "where's your proof?" or 
"says who?" 
 
This motto interestingly raises the first of many questions this article addresses, in 
this case: what is science?13 Why, for example, is astronomy a science, but astrology 
is not? The motto correctly identifies the core difference between science and non-
science as the requirement of proof. Philosophers and scientists alike exhibit a 
remarkable degree of agreement on this question. The following three can be 
regarded as exemplary. 
 
Kant's ideas on science are informed by both a rejection of metaphysics and an 
attempt to reconcile rationalism and empiricism. The second aspect will be dealt with 
later, but the first depends on his distinction between phenomena and noumena. 
Phenomena are things that can be observed and therefore known in a scientific way. 
These are the things we can know "the truth" about in some more-or-less absolute 
way. The noumena, on the other hand, are the things-in-themselves or the essences 
of things. These are things we cannot "know" in the scientific sense of the word 
since we cannot observe them.14 Noumena might be true and people might believe 
them to be true, but their truth cannot be established in a scientific manner. In this 
category Kant included God. 
 
It is interesting that Lyotard echoes this division, albeit in the postmodern 
vernacular. For Lyotard all knowledge consists of discourse and he distinguishes 
                                                 
13  It should be readily apparent that it is not possible to deal with this question exhaustively in this 
paper due to space constraints. Readers who are interested in a more thorough discussion can 
start with two excellent introductions: Gorham Philosophy of Science and Okasha Philosophy of 
Science. 
14  Kant Prolegomena 31. 
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between narrative and scientific discourse.15 Narrative discourse is where the truth 
of the statement is established by the mere telling of the story.16 It does not require 
external validation, because the narrative is self-validating. This corresponds to 
Kant's noumenal world and would include religious "stories". On the other hand, 
scientific discourse depends on a political narrative to legitimate it. Of course, 
Lyotard's point is that knowledge and truth are relative and dependent on outside 
(political) validation. In that he certainly does not support Kant's idea of absolute, 
objective truth. The link lies in the distinction between truth that needs no validation 
(noumena/narrative discourse) and truth that does need it (phenomena/scientific 
discourse). 
 
Popper approaches the problem from a slightly different angle. He wants to know: 
when is a theory scientific and when not? Theories abound in society: the theory 
that we never landed on the moon; that freemasons run the world; that CO2 
emissions cause global warming, and so forth. Which of these are worthy of 
scientific interest and enquiry? Obviously only scientifically valid theories can lead to 
scientific knowledge. Popper's view is that theories need not be proven to be true in 
order to be regarded as scientific. Instead they must be falsifiable.17 In other words 
only those theories that can be proved false are scientific.18 A belief that fairies live 
at the bottom of the garden or that unicorns have silver blood or that God exists are 
not scientific theories because they cannot be proved false. In this category also fall 
the theories which have already been proved wrong. They are regarded as 
contentless and therefore not scientific. In this regard pseudo-sciences like 
                                                 
15  Lyotard Postmodern Condition 31-37. 
16  This is, for example, the case with most religious "stories," which do not require proof. The mere 
fact that the story is told is enough for believers. 
17  This is the famous example of the theory that "all swans are white". It is impossible to observe 
all the swans in the world, therefore the theory cannot be proved true. However, the observation 
of one black swan would falsify the theory instantly.  
18  Popper Logic of Scientific Discovery 57-73. 
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phrenology19 join the ranks of the belief in a flat earth20 and man-made global 
warming.21 
 
What all of these ideas have in common is the insight that for knowledge to be 
scientific it needs something more than other kinds of knowledge. That something 
more takes various forms, but it can generally be characterised as proof. Science 
demands that you have something to back up your claims about the truth or 
falseness of a statement. That is why Banks insisted on collecting specimens and 
documenting the natural phenomena with drawings and descriptions. Without that, 
the voyage would have been an adventure instead of a scientific expedition. It 
needed the external validation. This article therefore takes the idea of proof (in the 
Popperian sense of falsification) as its point of departure.22 
 
For law to be a science, it therefore needs at least for its theories and statements to 
be falsifiable. Legal research therefore can never be about reiterating known truths 
or merely summarising case law. It needs at least to attempt to falsify the oracles of 
legal truth, such as courts, legislatures and so forth. Law can only be a science to 
the extent that it meets these requirements. This basic point of departure is 
important for the later discussion on disciplines. 
 
3 The many faces of science 
 
The characteristic that distinguishes science from the rest is therefore the insistence 
on proof through the process of falsification. But what "counts" as proof differs 
considerably between the sciences. Traditionally, in the university context, a 
                                                 
19  On the other hand, Schlag argues that law is as much a pseudo-science as phrenology – see 
Schlag 1997 Harvard LR 877-921. 
20  Garwood Flat Earth. 
21  See Lawson Appeal to Reason; Montford Hockey Stick Illusion; Ambler Don't Sell Your Coat; 
Sussman Eco-tyranny; Inhofe Greatest Hoax; Spencer Great Global Warming Blunder; Bell 
Climate of Corruption; Delingpole Watermelons. 
22  The acceptance of the Popperian view is sometimes regarded as controversial in the humanities, 
but in the other sciences it is much less controversial. However, dealing with the debate 
surrounding this is beyond the scope of this article. Please see the introductions to philosophy of 
science in Gorham Philosophy of Science and Okasha Philosophy of Science for thorough 
discussions of this topic. 
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distinction is made between the natural sciences, the social sciences and the human 
sciences (or humanities). Various reasons have been offered for this division, from 
claiming it is merely traditional to distinctions based on the subject matter. These 
reasons are not convincing. The idea of dividing a university into faculties or schools 
is fairly recent and traditionally everything was regarded as "Arts",23 so tradition 
cannot explain the division. The idea that the division is based on subject matter 
presupposes that natural sciences study nature, social sciences study society and 
humanities study humans. But that would make at least the distinction between 
social and human sciences problematic, as humans cannot be divorced from the 
society they live in. The differences are more fundamental and have to do with the 
methodologies of the various sciences. And those differences boil down to the 
difference between empiricism and rationalism.24 
 
Scientists have long been divided over the question of whether knowledge depends 
on empirical observation or on rational constructs. So it is worthwhile to spend some 
time examining these two methodologies. Empiricism rests on the assumption that 
objects of study must be observed empirically (that is by the senses) and from these 
observations we deduce general rules which provide the basis for predictions about 
future events.25 Astronomers had observed the orbit of Venus for hundreds of years 
and could therefore comfortably predict that a transit would occur on 3rd June 1769 
and would be observable from Haiti.26  
 
Rationalism, on the other hand, rests on the consideration of a problem (let's say 
what the basis of a society should be) and working out possible solutions rationally 
and logically. This might be necessary because, as Descartes would have it, our 
                                                 
23  Collini What Are Universities For? 23-26. 
24  I do not use "rationalism" here in its general meaning of "based on reason", but as a very 
specific methodology. 
25  This is known as "the" scientific method. See Gorham Philosophy of Science 54ff for a discussion 
of the difference between rationalism and empiricism. 
26  A transit occurs when Venus moves between the sun and the earth and can be seen from earth 
as a small black dot against the sun. It is one of the rarest predictable astronomical phenomena. 
The most recent transit occurred on 4th June 2012 and could be observed from South Africa. See 
NASA 2012 http://www.1.usa.gov/K0q2wc. 
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senses can be deceived,27 or because the specific phenomenon is not observable.28 
In the case of empiricism the "proof" therefore consists of observable phenomena 
and predictable occurrences, but in the case of rationalism the "proof" depends on 
the logical consistency and rational justification of a position. Of course, Kant 
showed more than 200 years ago that neither empiricism nor rationalism is possible 
without the other. It is impossible to observe the world without having some 
preconceptions about how the world is ordered – Kant calls this the a priori 
categories.29 Conversely, it is impossible to think about the world without that 
thinking being grounded in some sort of observable reality. Otherwise we would 
have had a School for Unicorn Studies where you can get a degree in paranormal 
"science".30 But that, for now, is not important. 
 
What is important is that there are sciences that, on a continuum, are more 
empirical than others.31 And that is the basis for the division of the sciences. The 
empirical (or natural) sciences include botany, zoology, geography, chemistry, 
physics,32 astronomy and the like. On the other hand, the rationalist (or human) 
sciences include disciplines like history, languages, philosophy, theology33 and the 
like. The social sciences reside in an ambivalent position between the two– sciences 
that have both an empirical and a rationalist component to their methodology. In 
this category are included economics, education, information science and 
psychology.34 
 
                                                 
27  Descartes Philosophical Writings 12: "Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true I have 
acquired either from the senses or through the senses. But from time to time I have found that 
the senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even 
once." 
28  See, for example, the social contract ideas of Hobbes and Locke, which work with an entirely 
unobservable "state of nature": Hobbes Leviathan; Locke Two Treatises on Civil Government. 
29  Kant Prolegomena 22: "(A)ll cognition assumed to be a priori is nothing but a long habit of 
accepting something as true, and hence of mistaking subjective necessity with objective." 
30  The idea for this example comes from Clarey Worthless. 
31  Please note that, as Kant made clear, a completely empirical science is impossible. It will always 
have a rationalist element. But some are indeed more empirical than others. 
32  Some aspects of contemporary physics deal with phenomena that are, as yet, unobservable. 
However, the basis remains empirical. See Smolin Trouble with Physics xviii. 
33  Theology is traditionally regarded as a science, even though it does not meet the criteria set out 
in section 2 above regarding falsification. 
34  On the basis of the falsification criteria set out in section 2 above, it is doubtful whether 
psychology would qualify  
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It is interesting to note that this division implies that mathematics (which is normally 
regarded as a natural science) should actually be regarded as part of the humanities. 
After all, numbers, equations and formulae are entirely man-made and essentially 
unobservable phenomena and therefore quintessentially rationalist.35 It also implies 
that Computer Science (as the study of algorithms) is a humanities discipline, even 
though it is usually grouped in the Science Faculty in the university context. And 
perhaps this is why many of the most prominent philosophers of science were 
mathematicians and recently computer scientists.36 But that is not the main 
conclusion to be drawn from this. The important thing is that the research 
methodology determines how we differentiate between the sciences. 
 
The question now is where law fits into this scheme. In the course of its history 
there have been attempts to cast law as a natural science in the same mould as 
physics.37 The Historical School,38 the Sociological School, the Realists (both 
Scandinavian and American)39 and more recently Law and Economics40 have all tried 
to make law a science modo geometrico. Perhaps the best-known example is still 
Langdell41 who famously said:  
 
It is indispensable to establish at least two things, first that law is a science; 
secondly that all the available materials of that science are contained in the 
printed books. 
 
For Langdell law was a science and the library was the laboratory where 
experiments were conducted.42 But anyone who deals with legal research on a daily 
basis will see that this argument is forced. While legal researchers might as a matter 
of course use objectively real "data" (case law, legislation, common law) they do not 
                                                 
35  Kant Prolegomena 13: "(M)athematical propositions are always judgements a priori, and not 
empirical, because they carry with them necessity, which cannot be obtained from experience." 
36  See eg Raymond Cathedral and the Bazaar. 
37  See eg Ross On Law and Justice 40. For an overview of this development in European legal 
systems, see Kop Legisme en Privaatrechtswetenschap. 
38  See eg Hugo Lehrbuch Eines Civilistischen Cursus 10§8: "Jurisprudenz und Mathematik grenzen 
auch näher an einander als mancher, der weder Jurist noch Mathematiker ist, weiss..." 
39  See Holmes 1897 Harvard LR 457-478. 
40  See Ross "Law and Economics" 186-213. 
41  Langdell Selection of Cases i. 
42  See Woxland 1989 Law Library Journal 451-464. See also Schlag 1997 Harvard LR 897 on the 
influence of Langdell. 
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use them in an empiricist manner. They are not regarded as exemplars that 
establish a natural law on the basis of which future predictions can be made. Law is 
too inherently unpredictable for that. Instead, they serve as starting points for 
interpretation and to illuminate differing perspectives on what the law is and might 
be. The world of graphs, data sets, questionnaires, laboratory experiments and 
computer models is as foreign to legal researchers as the surface of Venus was to 
Joseph Banks. Law is therefore very much a humanities discipline. 
 
But what the humanities teach is actually hard to pin down. And, once again, 
opinions are divided. Nussbaum states that the humanities teach "the ability to think 
critically; the ability to transcend local loyalties and to approach problems as a 
'citizen of the world; and, finally, the ability to imagine sympathetically the 
predicament of another person.'"43 On the other hand, Collini44 states as follows:  
 
Perhaps the most important single thing to say in this context about the work in 
the humanities is that it is in many ways not so different from work in the 
natural and social sciences. The effort to understand and explain that is at the 
heart of all scholarly and scientific enquiry is governed by broadly similar canons 
of accuracy and precision, of rigour in argument and clarity in presentation, of 
respect for the evidence and openness to criticism, and so on. 
 
Nussbaum's view of what humanities teach is not one that is limited to the 
humanities. Instead it should be the purpose of all higher education. What the two 
viewpoints illustrate is exactly that all sciences and scientific teaching have the same 
purpose – it is the methodology that differs. 
 
4 What is a discipline? 
 
Having established that law is part of the human sciences and is inclined toward the 
rationalist methodology, the question that now needs to be addressed is what kind 
of human science it is. After all, linguistics and history and law are not the same kind 
of sciences. So the question arises, what constitutes the difference? The difference 
has to do with the fact that, within the humanities, there are different disciplines. 
                                                 
43  See Nussbaum Not for Profit 7. See also Nussbaum Citizens of the World. 
44  Collini What are Universities For? 62. 
IJ KROEZE   PER / PELJ 2013(16)3 
 
46 / 392 
 
 
Let us start with the idea of a discipline. The term comes from the Latin discipulus – 
literally a student or disciple, but the idea of military discipline is also present.45 
Disciplines are distinguished from one another exactly because the disciples (junior 
researchers) are taught (by senior researchers) what the acceptable problems, 
methods, hypotheses and language usage are. It is, in fact, closely related to 
Thomas Kuhn's ideas about normal science and scientific revolutions.46 Kuhn argues 
that the majority of scientific work is done as part of "normal science". Normal 
science happens when the paradigm for that science is well established. A paradigm 
tells you what "counts" as research in a specific discipline: what methods you can 
use; what questions you can legitimately ask; what assumptions you can make; 
which hypotheses are acceptable; how you present your conclusions or findings and 
so forth.47 This is typically what students are taught when they write a research 
proposal. If that does not happen, the acolyte does not become a disciple and isn't 
accepted into the discipline. 
 
Research within normal science is a lot of drudgery – trying to disprove theories; 
working out the implications of existing theories – but it is the bulk of scientific work. 
This is what a discipline does: it teaches you the acceptable methodology for your 
field.48 It disciplines you so that your work is acceptable to others in your discipline. 
It gives you the matrix to be able to produce legitimate research results. 
 
                                                 
45  See Balkin 1996 Balkin 1996 Wash & Lee L Rev 955: "Academic disciplines, therefore, are about 
authority, and in particular, about authority within particular groups of persons who think alike 
through training and discipline....Disciplines involve not only shared subject matters and shared 
problems, but shared ways of thinking and talking." 
46  See Kuhn Structure of Scientific Revolutions. See also Balkin 1996 Wash & Lee L Rev 962. 
47  See Kuhn Structure of Scientific Revolutions 50-51 for an example of the difference between how 
a physicist and a chemist view the question of whether an atom of helium is or is not a molecule. 
48  Balkin 1996 Wash & Lee L Rev 954: "Thus, disciplinarity is not simply a matter of individual 
choice, the pursuit of individualized interests, or an individualized search for truth. Rather, it is 
the product of a set of social forces of normalization and education, of reward and punishment, 
through which the academic's head gets constructed, and the academic becomes the kind of 
academic that he or she is." 
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So what kind of discipline is law?49 There is no consensus on this question and a vast 
number of possibilities have been offered.50 These possibilities can broadly be 
grouped into three general approaches. The first group sees law as an empirical 
discipline, where case law, legislation and so forth are regarded as data to be 
studied.51 This sometimes takes the form of seeing law as an explanatory discipline. 
This means that legal research is regarded mainly as descriptive of legal rules and 
doctrines. Research is therefore limited to description in what Schlag52 calls the "grid 
aesthetic". In much the same vein law is sometimes seen as an axiomatic discipline 
which studies law as a taxonomy of concepts.53 This means that legal research is 
concerned with organising law into increasingly complex sets of terms and 
concepts.54 It also sees law as a logical discipline which studies how rules and 
concepts hang together systematically. This group of approaches can broadly be 
characterised as positivist since they take Comte's approach to sociology and apply it 
to law.55 
 
A second group sees law as a hermeneutic or argumentative discipline. The primary 
task of legal research is interpretation of texts as the basis for opinions and 
solutions.56 This is linked to the view of legal research as being focused on the kinds 
of arguments that are acceptable within law. Legal research is therefore primarily 
about argumentation.57 
 
                                                 
49  It will be noted that most of the references to law, legal methodology and legal research come 
from either continental or American writers. The fact of the matter is that South African authors 
rarely, if ever, engage with the question of the disciplinary nature of law and legal research. But, 
given the universal nature of science, the insights from these writers are applicable to the South 
African context. 
50  Van Hoecke "Legal Doctrine" 1-18. 
51  See Minda Postmodern Legal Movements 13 and Schlag 1997 Harvard LR 896-914 on the view of 
law as science and the role of Langdell in this development. 
52  See Schlag Enchantment of Reason. 
53  Coing 1989 Am J Comp L 13; Van Caenegem Historical Introduction to Private Law 140; Zwalve 
Hoofdstukken uit de Geschiedenis van het Europese Privaatrecht. 
54  Kelsen 1941 Harvard LR 44-70. 
55  See Jori "Introduction" i-xl. 
56  Winter 1990 Stanford LR 639-693; Winter 1991 Texas LR 1595-1626; Hutchinson 1994 Dalhousie 
LJ 263-277; Singer 1984 Yale LJ 1-70. 
57  This is the main contention behind the Realists' insistence on looking at "what courts actually do" 
– see Hoctor "Legal Realism" 158-185. 
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The third group represents a rejection of the positivism inherent in the first group in 
particular by seeing law as a normative discipline.58 In this case the emphasis of 
legal research is on constructing a normative framework for law in order that 
normative choices can be made.59 
 
In the South African context, most legal researchers will find one or more of these 
approaches convincing, based on where they studied – in effect, whose disciples 
they are/were. Traditionally Afrikaans universities use a descriptive, axiomatic and 
logical approach to the study of law, whilst the approach in English universities is 
focused on argumentation and normative approaches. Those who studied at the first 
set of universities will therefore be more inclined to view law as a very ordered and 
logical set of propositions and concepts, while those who studied at the second 
group will be more inclined toward seeing law as a set of normative disagreements. 
This, therefore, offers a striking illustration of the nature of research discipline and 
paradigms. 
 
It should be fairly clear that law is not an empirical discipline in the sense that 
chemistry is, for example.60 Describing law as an axiomatic, explanatory or logical 
discipline is too limited. Whilst description, systematisation and conceptualisation are 
certainly part of the picture, it is not enough to describe something as a scientific 
discipline. If we accept that falsification is the basic requirement for something to be 
regarded as scientific, then the first group of approaches fails at the first hurdle as 
they do not attempt to falsify, but merely to describe. 
 
The third group of approaches does not meet this requirement either. In Kantian 
terms the values, norms and other considerations belong to the realm of the 
                                                 
58  Dworkin Law's Empire; Finnis Natural Law. 
59  For a critique of this idea, see Schlag 1991 U Pa LR 801-932; Schlag 1990 Stanford LR 167-191; 
Hutchinson 1987 Yale LJ 637-665. 
60  Balkin 1996 Wash & Lee L Rev 969: "The point is not that legal education fails to teach lawyers 
how to engage in empirical research. The point is that it teaches lawyers how not to think 
empirically." 
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noumena.61 They are therefore inherently not falsifiable and therefore not scientific. 
As Schlag62 says:  
 
Values are like little divinities. Like God, they serve as grounds or unquestioned 
origins. Like God, their invocation demands worship, reverence and self-
abnegation. Like God, they provide comfort and compensation for an otherwise 
degraded reality. Like God, they enable the widespread belief in a hopeful, 
eschatological trajectory for law, politics, and human existence. In short, 'values' 
are the secular equivalent of God – they are the continuation of theology by 
other means. 
 
The second group offers the most promising approach. The paradigmatic 
methodology in legal research is the finding, interpretation, application and critique 
of law and legal rules. That implies that normal legal research (in the Kuhnian sense) 
will always consider the history, philosophy, comparative perspective and socio-
political circumstances of any specific problem. Most importantly, the essence of this 
methodology is the implicit acceptance of the principle of falsification. Any theory 
about any legal problem starts with the assumption: the court/legislator/old 
authority/state got it wrong! It therefore meets the falsification requirement. But 
that is not the full picture. 
 
What is missing is the fact that law is also very much a professional discipline. In 
fact Balkin63 argues that law is not an academic discipline at all, exactly because of 
its professional nature. Most law professors were trained in professional law schools 
and continue to teach their students how to "think like lawyers". As Balkin64 states: 
"(Law) is a skills-oriented profession, and legal education is a form of professional 
education. Because law is a professional discipline, it lacks a robust academic 
methodology...." The discussion above indicates that this is overstating the case. 
Ironically, "thinking like a lawyer" strengthens the falsification thesis. After all, the 
job of a criminal lawyer, for example, is not to prove his client's innocence, but to 
falsify the state's case. 
 
                                                 
61  Gorham Philosophy of Science and Okasha Philosophy of Science. 
62  Schlag "Values" 50. See also Kroeze 2005 SA Public Law 320-334. 
63  Balkin 1996 Wash & Lee L Rev 952. 
64  Balkin 1996 Wash & Lee L Rev 964. 
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The conclusion is therefore that law is a hermeneutic and professional discipline. 
That is what determines the methodology, research questions, assumptions and 
hypotheses. It might not sound glamorous or exciting, but that's what makes it a 
discipline! 
 
5 So what is MIT? 
 
Given the methodological differences between the sciences and the disciplinary 
distinctiveness, one wonders what MIT could possibly mean or entail. And 
determining the meaning here is far from simple. In fact, there seem to be as many 
opinions as there are authors.65 The explanation offered below is informed in the 
first place by the principle of statutory interpretation that, if different words are 
used, they must mean different things. In the second place it is informed by insights 
from other disciplines – something that definitely does NOT make it MIT. Given 
these points of departure, the following distinctions can be drawn.66 
 
Multidisciplinary research means that scientists from a multiplicity of disciplines look 
at the same phenomenon/problem.67 It is always a group effort. In the case of 
Banks's voyage, you have zoologists, botanists, astronomers, etcetera looking at 
Haiti from different disciplinary stances.68 In a sense this is the easiest kind of MIT 
research: every scientist works within and from his/her own discipline and the 
different perspectives come together in the end.69 It might or might not result in co-
publication. 
 
                                                 
65  See McNeill, García-Godos and Gjerdaker Interdisciplinary Research 8 for one such example. 
66  This is also the distinction used in Vashist, McKay and Marchall 2011 
http://aise1.aisnet.org/acis2011/54. 
67  See Carayol and Thi 2005 Research Evaluation 71 and Janssen and Goldsworthy 1996 
Agricultural Systems 260-261. 
68  An excellent example of this is the animal rights conference hosted by the Department of 
Jurisprudence at UNISA last year. All of the papers of that conference were published in the first 
edition of SA Public law for 2012. 
69  As Fish says: "One is always within whatever discipline one is in, and one simply assimilates and 
feeds information from and about other disciplines into one's pre-existing disciplinary matrix" – 
see Fish There's No Such Thing as Free Speech 231-242. 
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Interdisciplinary research is unusual and very, very hard to do. This happens when a 
single researcher is a disciplinary expert in more than one discipline and he/she uses 
the methodology of both to address a problem.70 It is interesting to note that many 
of the most brilliant and innovative scientists were trained in more than one 
discipline.71 For example the astronomer William Herschel started life as a 
professional musician and composer, and taught himself mathematics and the craft 
of polishing large mirrors. This enabled him to build very powerful telescopes which 
he used to discover Uranus, amongst other discoveries. In fact, historians speculate 
that it was his skill in reading music that enabled him to search the stars more 
systematically than his contemporaries.72 
 
In the legal world interdisciplinary research would, for example, be undertaken by 
someone qualified in both medicine and law; or versed in both law and literary 
theory and criticism. Unfortunately law researchers think that if they can read 
novels, they can do law and literature, but that is not the case.73 True 
interdisciplinary research requires a thorough grounding in more than one discipline. 
Having a postgraduate qualification in both law and economics; both medicine and 
law; both computer science and law; or both sociology and law qualifies one to do 
interdisciplinary work. The rest do not. And the fact of the matter is that law's 
professional nature militates very strongly against this. 
 
Transdisciplinary research is even rarer. This is where interdisciplinary research 
results in the establishment of a new discipline.74 This is the case where, for 
example, Banks established anthropology by using the disciplines of zoology and 
botany and applying it to human beings and culture. But this implies that the 
methodologies of two distinct disciplines get merged into a completely new and 
                                                 
70  This is also the definition that is used in UNISA's various research policies.  
71  Of course, in the contemporary world this is becoming increasingly unlikely. When science 
became a professional enterprise rather than something "gentlemen of leisure" engaged in, 
specialisation became inevitable.  
72  Holmes Age of Wonder 92. 
73  See Silbey 2007 http://Isr.nellco.org/suffolk_fp/45 on law and literature. 
74  There is a different opinion that states that transdisciplinarity refers to research with a strong 
practical component – see eg Rosenfield 1992 Soc Sci Med 1343-1357. But this is what is usually 
called "action research" and does not necessarily include more than one discipline. 
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separate discipline and that, from there, it will have its own disciplinary rules, 
conventions and methodology. Transdisciplinary research is therefore the route of 
merging two disciplines, which then leads to a new set of disciplinary rules and 
conventions. 
 
It turns out that calls for interdisciplinary (or MIT) research might rest on a limited 
understanding of the nature of science and of disciplinary research in law. Legal 
research almost always incorporates information from other disciplines. In this 
respect, as in many others, it consciously or unconsciously mirrors court decisions. It 
is not unusual for an article on, for example, property law to also include historical, 
comparative and sociological research.75 And this is neither unusual nor 
interdisciplinary. For law, this is normal science or, if you prefer, "business as usual". 
 
The call for interdisciplinary (or MIT) research is used to indicate (rather vaguely) 
research that is somehow hip, new, different and that it will be somehow "more" 
than ordinary disciplinary research. The background assumptions are that the 
differences between the terms multi-, inter- and transdisciplinary research are of 
degree rather than kind and that they will always imply group research and/or co-
publication. But using them like this is both facile and misleading. 
 
Multidisciplinary research might result in co-publication, but it probably won't. Given 
that multidisciplinarity requires disciplinary specialists to continue to work within 
their disciplines, it really is neither new nor particularly different. Interdisciplinarity 
by definition is an individual enterprise, but it is the only case where innovative work 
and results can be expected. Transdisciplinarity presupposes the establishment of a 
new discipline, one that will then take on all the characteristics of ordinary 
disciplinary research. 
 
And all of this does not even begin to address the question lurking in the 
background – like the proverbial elephant in the room: what is wrong with 
disciplinary research anyway? This is not to suggest that there might not be 
                                                 
75  See, for example, Van der Walt 1995 SAJHR 169-206; Van der Walt 1998 Acta Juridica 235-281. 
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something wrong, just that this has not been demonstrated. To return to the Royal 
Society: where's your proof? 
 
6 Conclusion: is interdisciplinarity possible in law? 
 
Balkin76 argues that interdisciplinary "colonisation" of law has been unsuccessful for 
a very simple reason:  
 
The study of law is part of a professional practice, a set of professional skills that 
are taught to new professionals in professional schools. Law is, moreover, a 
deceptively strong professional practice, and its modes of reproduction are 
amazingly resilient. Thus, even though law professors continually absorb ever 
new and exotic forms of theory from without, they continue to teach their 
students the same basic skills using the same basic methods. 
 
Whether or not interdisciplinarity is possible in law therefore depends on your 
understanding of law as a hermeneutic and professional discipline. To explain this, it 
is necessary to return to the terms multi-, inter- and transdisciplinarity. 
 
Multidisciplinarity is not only possible in law, it is something legal researchers 
regularly do, have done and will continue to do. Because law is a social artefact, the 
consideration of legal issues and problems will always and necessarily require 
looking at socio-political and economic factors, for example. This is a conscious or 
unconscious mirroring of what courts do. A judicial decision that looks at legal rules 
and legal rules only is basically impossible. That is one of the reasons why regarding 
law as an axiomatic or logical discipline only is impossible. 
 
There is virtually no legal researcher in South Africa today that does not accept that 
law and legal research makes sense only within a socio-economic-political context.77 
Therefore normal science in law will also include insights from various disciplines. 
Once again, this is normal and does not constitute interdisciplinary research. So the 
fact of the matter is that law academics have always undertaken multidisciplinary 
                                                 
76  Balkin 1996 Wash & Lee L Rev 966. 
77  This is a falsifiable theory and therefore worthy of scientific investigation. 
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research. It seldom results in co-publication with other disciplines though, precisely 
because of the nature of law as a discipline.  
 
Transdisciplinary research is actually a misnomer. Once interdisciplinary research has 
become successful, it results in the establishment of a new discipline. This new 
discipline will then exhibit all the characteristics of a discipline – policing the 
methodologies, assumptions, hypotheses and research questions that are regarded 
as legitimate. In law we have two examples of transdisciplinarity – legal history and 
legal philosophy. Established by researchers who were experts in both law and 
historical research or law and philosophy, the new disciplines no longer require the 
practitioners to be experts in both disciplines. The new disciplines have their own 
rules and initiates are coached in these disciplinary rules. 
 
Interdisciplinary research, on the other hand, is a different kettle of fish altogether. 
Interdisciplinarity is basically impossible in law exactly because of the nature of law 
as a professional discipline. Law researchers are mostly also law teachers and they 
are in the business of teaching students how to think like lawyers. You cannot very 
well do that if you yourself are not thinking like a lawyer. Law resists the colonisation 
by other disciplines because of the need to maintain its professional credentials. In 
addition, much of what is fondly imagined to be interdisciplinary research is, in fact, 
multidisciplinary work. Working with medical specialists on issues of stem cell 
research is multidisciplinary research. It becomes interdisciplinary only if the 
researcher also holds a medical degree. Law researchers are, for good or bad, still 
"writing for judges".78 
 
It is in this context that the call for interdisciplinary research on legal education and 
pedagogy provides a good example.79 Despite the fact that law researchers are 
constantly asked to do this kind of research, it is something they are particularly 
unequipped for. Education, as was pointed out above, is a social science with a 
particular penchant for empirical research. It is something law academics cannot and 
                                                 
78  Schlag 1992 U Colo L Rev 419-423. 
79  In the UNISA context this is called ODL (Open Distance Learning) research, but at other 
universities referred to as self-reflective research. 
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probably should not be engaged with. Law researchers have neither the training nor 
the aptitude nor the need for it. Teaching lawyers is such a big part of law as a 
professional discipline that general theories of education simply do not apply. 
Expecting law academics to do this kind of research is futile and counter-productive. 
 
The conclusion is that interdisciplinarity is a dream in legal research. Because of the 
nature of the disciplinary training that lawyers undergo, they are not equipped to do 
the kind of research that is undertaken in the natural and social sciences. As Balkin80 
says:  
 
The point is not that legal education fails to teach lawyers how to engage in 
empirical research. The point is that it teaches lawyers how not to think 
empirically. Law school teaches lawyers to be quick on their feet and to look for 
the sort of things that can be cited in the footnotes of briefs.  
 
So, there is both bad news and good news. The bad news is that the vast majority 
of MIT research is something legal researchers already do (multidisciplinary 
research) or never will (interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research). That is also 
the good news. Disciplinary research is hard enough. There is no need to complicate 
it unnecessarily. 
  
                                                 
80  Balkin 1996 Wash & Lee L Rev 969. 
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